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with the subject matter of his decision. 
Bias will not be dealt with as a matter of 
speculation to be drawn from mere cir-
cumstances in which the decision maker 
might find himself. Bias must be shown 
to exist from the facts and must be of 
such personal or pecuniary nature as 
would render the decision maker dis-
qualified. This conclusion is in agree-
ment with the classic statement of the 
United States Court of Appeals in In re 
Linahan, 138 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1943), 
by Peter H. Meyers 
(Reprinted from The Leaflet, 




The U.S. Supreme Court ended its 
1975-76 Term in July with five separate 
decisions Significantly weakening the 
Fourth Amendment's protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure. The 
Court: 
• Ruled 5-4 that police officers can 
constitutionally search the unlocked 
glove compartment of a car impounded 
for traffic Violations, as part of a routine 
"inventory" of the car's contents. In this 
case, police had found a bag of 
marijuana in the glove compartment, 
and the defendant had been convicted 
of possession. The Court's opinion ap-
pears to leave open the question of 
whether a search of a locked glove com-
partment or trunk as part of a routine 
"inventory" would also be constitu-
tional. South Dakota v. Opperman, 44 
U.S.L.W 5294 (July 6, 1976). 
• Ruled 7-2 that a heroin suspect ob-
served by police as she stood in the open 
doorway of her home could be arrested 
without a warrant because the doorway 
of a house which is open to public view 
from the street is equivalent to any other 
"public place". US. v. Santana, 44 
U.S.L.W 4970 (June 25, 1976). The 
Court held earlier this Term that a war-
rantless arrest in a public place upon 
probable cause would not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. 
that "[i]f, however, 'bias' and 'partiality' 
be defined to mean the total absence of 
pre-conceptions in the mind of the 
judge, then no one has ever had a fair 
trial and no one ever will .... In addition 
to those acquired social value judg-
ments, every judge, however, unavoid-
ably has many idiosyncratic 'learnings of 
the mind', uniquely personal prejudices, 
which may interfere with his fairness at a 
trial. ... Frankly, to recognize the exis-
tence of such prejudices is the part of 
• Ruled 5-3 that the Fourth Amend-
ment's exclusionary rule does not forbid 
the use in a federal civil proceeding of 
evidence seized unconstitutionally, but 
in good faith, by state police officers. 
US. v. Janis, 44 U.S.L. W. 5303 (July 6, 
1976). The Court specifically left open 
the questions of whether evidence 
seized unconstitutionally by state police 
could be used in a state civil proceeding, 
and whether evidence seized unconstitu-
tionally by federal police could be used 
in a federal civil proceeding. 
• Ruled 6-3 that "where the State 
has provided an opportunity for full and 
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment 
claim, a state prisoner may not be 
granted federal habeas corpus relief on 
the ground that evidence obtained in an 
unconstitutional search or seizure was in-
troduced at his trial." Stone v. Powell, 
wisdom. The conscientious judge will, as 
far as possible, make himself aware of his 
biases of this character, and, by that very 
self knowledge, nullify their effect." Id. at 
651-52. 
Such principles are necessary in order 
to maintain the balance between the in-
dividual's right to due process and the 
interest of the state in seeing to it that its 
agencies administer certain aspects of 
government with a maximum of effec-
tiveness. 
photo by June Chaplin 
44 U.S.L.W. 5313 (July 6,1976). This 
decision means that, except in very rare 
instances, only the Supreme Court, and 
not the lower federal courts, can con-
sider whether evidence obtained in an 
unconstitutional search was introduced 
in a state trial. With the Supreme Court's 
heavy caseload, it will hear only a small 
number of these cases. 
• Ruled 7-2 that Border Patrol offi-
cials at fixed checkpoints on U.S. high-
ways near international borders may 
stop a vehicle and question its occupants 
about their right to be in this country, 
even without a reasonable suspicion that 
the vehicle contains illegal aliens. US. v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, U.S.L.W 5336 (July 6, 
1976). Last Term, the Court held that 
roving border patrols could not stop a 
vehicle without a reasonable suspicion 
that it contained illegal aliens. 
